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Sie scheinen allein zu sein, doch ahnen sie immer.1 
Hölderlin, “Wie wenn am Feiertage” 
 
We seem to be living in times which have made us forget how to hope. Amid the many pressing 
issues of our day—climate change, failing political and public institutions, the widening gap 
between rich and poor, geopolitical tension and conflict, the encroaching force of technology 
into the fabric of our lives—people seem to feel fatalistic, powerless in the face of developments 
that we may have set into motion ourselves, but which no one can claim to control or steer 
anymore. The world seems adrift and moved along by uncertain currents which leave no room 
for active hope, for informed praxis aimed at creating a better future. The canon of progress has 
been brought to a grinding halt, except for those who still claim to believe in the invisible hand 
of unaccountable, global finance. They will say that, on the whole, more people are better off 
than ever before. But the erosion of democratic participation, of a meaningful perspective for 
social development, the withering away of structures that embody solidarity, and the economic 
instrumentalization of education stare also these people in the face. In this situation, we might 
well ask where we find the resources for hope. For without hope, without a sense of vision and 
purpose, it seems the apathy cannot be broken. Ernst Bloch argued that hope can be 
                                               
1 “They seem to be alone, but their foreknowledge continues.” Friedrich Hölderlin, “As on a 
Holiday,” in Poems of Friedrich Hölderlin, trans. James Mitchell (San Francisco: Ithuriel’s 
Spear Press, 2004), 17. 
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disappointed, and in a way even has to be disappointed, for otherwise it would not be hope but 
assurance. Yet it seems that today the talk of hope, or of its disappointment, has receded into 
irrelevance. There are no hopes to disappoint; what we find is resignation that has even forgotten 
it is that. What can we learn from reconsidering Geist der Utopie?  
 In his recent acceptance speech for the Ernst Bloch Prize of the city of Ludwigshafen, 
Axel Honneth considered the contemporary malaise.2 He argues we can learn from Bloch that 
hope is both an affect and a virtue, and that we need grounds to hope. Following Kant, who faced 
a similar general lack of faith in progress in his time, Honneth divides the grounds for hope in a 
cognitive and a volitional side. Hope is strengthened by reasons that show the plausibility or 
achievability of what is hoped for, as well as by exhortations of the will to act and bring about 
the desired situations. For Kant, Honneth reminds us, this dual approach meant on the one hand 
the necessity of developing a social history that shows how progress has always happened, even 
if not unchecked or at all times, and what the mechanisms of progress have been. On the other 
hand it meant the presence, in the public sphere, of Geschichtszeichen, signs of the times—
concrete remembrances from living memory of individuals or groups who had successfully 
brought about social transformation. In this way, Kant argues, the will for active engagement in 
processes of social transformation is stimulated because we become aware of people just like us, 
who have been successful in pursuing the type of ideals we also strive for or at least subscribe to. 
At the same time this can be effective because of our understanding of the causes and reasons of 
progress. This is, in broad outline, Kant’s idea of a “universal history with a cosmopolitan 
                                               
2 Axel Honneth, “Hoffnung in hoffnungslosen Zeiten,” in Bloch-Almanach 34, ed. Klaus Kufeld 
(Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2017), 15–27. 
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purpose.”3 Honneth’s own theory of the dynamics of social progress, summarized in the phrase 
“struggle for recognition,” combines both these factors. Building on Dewey’s idea of the will to 
believe (that the realization of a goal becomes more likely if we believe in its realization) and 
Marx’s idea of class struggle as the basic form of social transformation, Honneth shows that 
there have been many instances in the recent past of disenfranchised groups claiming social 
recognition. We can think of the suffragette movement, feminism in general, the American civil 
rights movement, acceptance of sexual diversity, and the broad acceptance of children’s rights 
since the Second World War. In all these cases we are dealing with recent examples, from living 
memory, of social change that follows the structure of the struggle for recognition and results in 
a situation hardly anyone would now wish to turn back, while at the time these struggles were 
fought precisely as that—struggles. If we continue to create better, empirical, concrete, historical 
understandings of the social dynamics underlying these transformations and at the same time 
create more space for contemporary Geschichtszeichen, motivational representations that show 
us what we are capable of, we might find the way back to hope.  
 In all of this Bloch’s philosophy of hope can only guide us so far, Honneth argues: 
an dieser Stelle, an der es auf empirische Wahrscheinlichkeiten und 
Plausibilitäten ankäme, lässt uns die Philosophie Blochs, überspitzt gesagt, im 
Regen stehen; sie fertigt uns mit ontologischen Versicherungen ab, wo wir doch 
nach konkreten Anhaltspunkten für Möglichkeiten des Fortschritts im Hier und 
Jetzt hungern.4 
                                               
3 Immanuel Kant, “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht,” in Kant, 
Werke in zwölf Bänden, vol. XI (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1964), 33–50. 
4 Honneth, “Hoffnung,” 19. 
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[At this point, where empirical probabilities and plausibility matter, Bloch’s 
philosophy, strongly put, leaves us out in the cold; it serves us ontological 
reassurances, while we hunger, after all, for concrete indicators of possibilities of 
progress, here and now. (my translation)] 
Only Bloch’s Naturrecht und menschliche Würde does not engage in the ontological assurances 
of a phenomenology of hope or the archaeology of bygone utopian imaginations, but offers a 
concrete remembrance of the struggles for human dignity and integrity that have run through the 
modern period.5 If Honneth is right, Bloch’s work is now largely historical, itself a sign of the 
struggles for recognition in the twentieth century. Perhaps it can function as a public monument 
with motivational force because of the pathos of its prose. Perhaps it can still help us to 
understand, at a purely theoretical level, what hope is, as affect and as virtue or capability for 
action, but that is all. 
 This analysis of contemporary hopelessness fits into the concept of a social pathology of 
reason, one of Honneth’s central ideas.6 Here the general hopelessness results from a lack of 
understanding about the causes of social progress and an absence of motivational, real examples 
of where progress has been achieved. In a paradoxical sense Honneth’s analysis of the causes of 
hopelessness suffers from an overly abstract picture of social transformation. A reminder of how 
social transformation works and of the successes achieved so far may not be enough in the 
present context. The institutional mechanisms that might bring about social progress are no 
longer available the way they were in the past. In many democracies, political representation can 
no longer rely on the party as a leverage of concrete change because the way the political system 
                                               
5 Ernst Bloch, Naturrecht und menschliche Würde (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1961). 
6 See Axel Honneth, Pathologien der Vernunft. Geschichte und Gegenwart der kritischen 
Theorie (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2007). 
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has become gridlocked in economic interests has reduced its capacity for independent action 
supporting the ideals of social progress. At the same time the public sphere is less and less able 
to resist colonization by the interests of power and money, thus compromising its epistemic 
function, on which both sources of Honneth’s awakening of hope depend.7  
 It is instructive to note that the founding text of the Frankfurt School, Dialektik der 
Aufklärung, was written during the Second World War, also a time of despair, and that Geist der 
Utopie was written during the First World War, a similar time. Horkheimer and Adorno’s text 
offers considerably less ground for hope in the actual dynamics and transformational potential of 
Enlightenment rationality than Honneth is looking for today in that same history. Not just an 
exhortation, Bloch’s text sought to offer a real, existential access to hope as an active connection 
to what is open in the world, what might be—a connection to, as the final words of the book say, 
“Wahrheit als Gebet” [truth as prayer]. We have four stages: Kant at the end of the eighteenth 
century, Bloch at the beginning of the twentieth century, Horkheimer and Adorno in the middle 
of the twentieth century, and Honneth in the early twenty-first century.  
 It is doubtful that for Kant the situation was exactly the way Honneth describes it. His 
text concerned history from a cosmopolitan perspective, but for Kant the secular perspective was 
distinguishable, although not removable from the absolute moral dimension, because it relies on 
the immortality of the soul and the punishment of the wicked after death, without which there is 
strictly speaking no moral fact of reason and no categorical imperative. The horizon of mortality 
plays a constitutive role for Kant, even if this does not amount to a theoretical demonstration of 
our ultimate destiny, only a morally postulated one. Yet without this horizon, the persuasive 
                                               
7 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2014); Jürgen Habermas, “Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy 
Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research,” 
Communication Theory 16, no.4 (2006): 411–26. 
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power of history becomes precarious. Like Bloch, Kant does give, and rely on, “ontological 
reassurances” to underpin his concept of universal history. Bloch was keenly sensitive to this 
dimension of Kant’s thought. In many places in his work he cites Kant’s metaphor of the scales 
of hope and reason with respect to the afterlife from Träumen eines Geistersehers erläutert 
durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766): 
Ich finde nicht, dass irgendeine Anhänglichkeit, oder sonst eine vor der Prüfung 
eingeschlichene Neigung meinem Gemüte nach allerlei Gründen vor oder dawider 
benehme, eine einzige ausgenommen. Die Verstandeswaage ist doch nicht ganz 
unparteiisch, und eine Arm derselben, die die Aufschrift führet: Hoffnung der 
Zukunft, hat einen mechanischen Vorteil, welcher macht, dass auch leichte 
Gründe, welche in die ihm angehörige Schale fallen, die Spekulationen von an 
sich größeren Gewichte auf der andern Seite in die Höhe ziehen. Dieses ist die 
einzige Unrichtigkeit, die ich nicht wohl heben kann, und die ich in der Tat auch 
niemals heben will.” 
[I do not find that there are any attachments in my mind, nor do I find that any 
unexamined inclination has insinuated itself into my mind, which had deprived it 
of its readiness to be guided by any kind of reason, for or against. But the scales 
of the understanding are not, after all, wholly impartial. One of the arms, which 
bears the inscription: Hope for the future, has a mechanical advantage; and that 
advantage has the effect that even weak reasons, when placed on the appropriate 
side of the scales, cause speculations, which are in themselves of greater weight, 
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to rise on the other side. This is the only defect, and it is one which I cannot easily 
eliminate. Indeed, it is a defect which I cannot even wish to eliminate.]8 
At the end of this text, Kant explicitly links the irrational but literally durchschlaggebende bias 
to the stance in which we leave abstruse and hubristic speculations regarding our final destiny for 
what they are and, like Candide, go into the garden, work, and achieve happiness for ourselves, 
“da […] unser Schicksal in der künftigen Welt vermutlich sehr darauf ankommen mag, wie wir 
unseren Posten in den gegenwärtigen Welt verwaltet haben” [But since our fate in that future 
world will probably very much depend on how we have comported ourselves at our posts in this 
world].9 Here we see quite a different complex of relations between secular and divine history, 
and between hope and grounding reason, than the picture that might emerge from the Idea of 
Universal History alone. 
 It may not be impossible to extract parts of Kant’s thought from the whole of it and 
develop these in different directions (indeed that has always been done and is still done today) 
and it may be necessary to reinterpret the religious form in which Kant thinks. However, from 
the point of view of pathologies of reason we can use the organic, interdependent connection 
between the empirical and the transcendent dimensions in Kant—Wissen and Glauben 
[knowledge and belief]—to trace a problem with Honneth’s analysis of the social pathology of 
hopelessness. Here the work on radical hope by psychoanalyst Jonathan Lear can help us. He 
shows that there is a distinction between mere optimism and radical hope.10 We can capture this 
                                               
8 Immanuel Kant, “Träumen eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik” in 
Kant, Werke in zwölf Bänden, vol. II, 961 (A 75). In English: “Dreams of a spirit-seer, elucidated 
by dreams of metaphysics,” in Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, trans. and ed. David Walford 
and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 337. 
9 Ibid., 989 (A 128); Kant “Dreams,” 359. 
10 Jonathan Lear, Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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distinction by contrasting hopes in the plural with hope in the singular, a distinction made by 
Matthew Ratcliffe on the basis of Lear’s work.11 We may, in many different ways, lose our 
hopes that certain desirable situations may be brought about, or that we will be able to meet 
certain challenges, either individually or collectively, but this does not have to mean that we lose 
hope in a more fundamental sense. By this Lear means hope that there can be a meaningful 
future at all, that new things are still possible, and life may be found. Ratcliffe links the loss of 
hope in this radical sense to depression. Lear shows, by retelling the harrowing story of the 
demise of the Crow Native American people, how a way of life, a culture, may become 
irredeemably caught up in the grip of a loss of radical hope. In the words of Plenty Coups, the 
last Crow Chief: “When the buffalo went away, the hearts of my people fell to the ground and 
they could not lift them up again. After this nothing happened.”12 Lear argues that Plenty Coups 
was able to regain radical hope by transforming his traditional understanding of what it means to 
have courage. He did this by staying faithful to a prophetic dream he had, which seemed to him 
to come from the spiritual world, and which signified that a new life would be possible, even if it 
was now unimaginable and would be completely different from the life his people had lived 
before. He was not far away from the helpfully imbalanced and anticipatory dream of a spirit 
seer Kant confessed to, and could not have done without. Plenty Coups found a way to connect 
with, and derive a sense of agency and identity from, the open future, which, because of his 
dream, he no longer experienced as a waste land. He sought to unify his people around this 
dream, as an instrument of solidarity. In a now not Honnethian-ironical sense Plenty Coups 
found a meaningful ontological reassurance, which allowed him to regain and reclaim radical 
                                               
11 Matthew Ratcliffe, “What is it to Lose Hope?,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 
12, no. 4 (2013): 597–614. 
12 Lear, Radical Hope, 2. 
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hope, as an act of courage, rather than as the result of motivational propaganda and historical 
explanation. It seems that the experience of the Crow shows us a side of what Bloch so often 
calls “dreaming,” or “forward daydreaming,” that cannot be reduced to the dialectic of myth and 
enlightenment to which Honneth’s analysis seems to want to revert under more credulously 
promising stars. 
 We have to ask if the material changes in society today amount to the cultural devastation 
that befell the Crow people, and here we must be careful. The contemporary state of 
hopelessness is not induced by the total destruction of a way of life. And so I claim that we can 
take up Geist der Utopie today and read it as a Janus-faced book: when we look back, we can see 
how it shaped, in a fundamental and not yet adequately recognized way, the use of the idea of 
utopia in the philosophy and cultural theory of the past century. If we look the other way, into the 
future, we do not so much find cognitive, causal insights into social change, nor the exhortative 
remembrance of past achievements, but rather the book can provide insight into the nature of 
reality that still sheds light on what it means for people to have a future, and how to relate to this 
aspect of our existence, to futurity, in a way that is not colonizing and not determined by the fear 
of insecurity or by wishful fantasy. Like Plenty Coups, Bloch offers us access to the courage of 
radical hope by exploring a dream about a possible future, but we lack, as yet, the imaginative, 
intellectual, artistic, philosophical, religious, and cultural resources to articulate it. The book 
shows us what dreaming might yet be. In the chapter on the aesthetics of the ornament, or in the 
opening reflection on the jar and its merely intimated interior, the baroque prose of Geist der 
Utopie circles around a still, dark, ineffable core about which the book speaks, or better which 
contains what it says. Far from losing itself in ontological reassurances, Bloch’s philosophy 
opens up the existential access to hope, without which well-founded optimism, social history, 
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and the pragmatic will to believe retain that tiny dose of the gratuitous that can easily become 
fatal. As in the case of the Crow people, as in the case of the mechanical skew on the side of 
hope for the future, this dreamed access to an open future has the power to establish collectivity. 
The self-problem, Bloch likes to say, becomes a we-problem. There is a connection between on 
one hand the ability to relate, to others as well as to self, and on the other creative openness to an 
indeterminate future.  
 In May 1917, Bloch sent off the manuscript of Geist der Utopie to the printer. There was 
a paper shortage because of the war, and so it wasn’t until early 1918 that the book was 
published. Otto Klemperer had been asked to read the manuscript because by far the longest 
chapter (150 pages) was devoted to the philosophy of music. He recommended publication. 
Margarete Susman wrote one of the first, enthusiastic reviews, claiming that the book contained 
nothing less than “a new metaphysics.” Encountering it was like finding a house where a light is 
still shining when you are out in the forest on a cold, dark night in a snow storm. Walter 
Benjamin read the book shortly before meeting Bloch. He wrote to Gerschom Scholem that this 
was the only book he could measure himself against as an equal, and that he owed essential 
elements of his thought to it. It does not take much effort to see that Benjamin recognized 
notions that were to remain central to his own work: Eingedenken, restitutio ad integrum, 
messianic time, future in the past.13 Also the young Adorno, still a teenager at the time, read the 
book. In a late text (1965) he recalls his experience: 
Der dunkelbraune, auf dickem Papier gedruckte, über vierhundert Seiten lange 
Band versprach etwas von dem, was man von mittelalterlichen Büchern sich 
erhofft. […] Der “Geist der Utopie” sah aus, als wäre er von des Nostradamus 
                                               
13 For an overview of the early responses to Geist der Utopie, see Sylvia Markun and Hans Heinz 
Holz, Ernst Bloch: Monographie – System und Fragment (Halle: Projekte-Verlag, 2010). 
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eigener Hand geschrieben. Auch der Name Bloch hatte diese Aura. Dunkel wie 
ein Tor, gedämpft dröhnend wie ein Posaunenstoß, weckte er eine Erwartung des 
Ungeheuren, die mir rasch genug die Philosophie, mit der ich studierend bekannt 
wurde, als schal und unterhalb ihres eigenen Begriffs verdächtig machte. (…) Ich 
hatte das Gefühl, hier sei die Philosophie dem Fluch des Offiziellen entronnen. 
(…) Es war eine Philosophie, die vor der avancierten Literatur nicht sich zu 
schämen hatte, nicht abgerichtet zur abscheulichen Resignation der Methode. (…) 
Das Buch (…) dünkte mir eine einzige Revolte gegen die Versagung, die im 
Denken, bis in seinen pur formalen Charakter hinein, sich verlängert. 
[The dark brown volume of over 400 pages, printed on thick paper, promised 
something of what one hopes for from medieval books (…). The Spirit of Utopia 
looked as though it had been written by Nostradamus himself. The name Bloch 
had the same aura. Dark as a gateway, with a muffled blare like a trumpet blast, it 
aroused the expectation of something vast, an expectation that quickly rendered 
the philosophy with which I had become acquainted as a student suspect as 
shallow and unworthy of its own concept. (…) I had the feeling that here 
philosophy had escaped the curse of being official. (…) Bloch’s was a philosophy 
that could hold its head high before the most advanced literature; a philosophy 
that was not calibrated to the abominable resignation of methodology. (…) The 
book (…) seemed to me to be one prolonged rebellion against the renunciation 
within thought that extends even into its purely formal character.]14 
                                               
14 Theodor W. Adorno, “Henkel, Krug und frühe Erfahrung,” in Noten zur Literatur 
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 557; in English: “The Handle, the Pot, and Early 
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Again, in this short fragment the connection between an existentially lived radical hope that 
remains inaccessible to the coordination by method is contrasted with a resignation of thought to 
its official, technological, and formal character that even falls behind despair. 
 It is not my intention here to trace the intellectual history of the idea of utopia in 
twentieth-century German thought, but from these few references it becomes clear that Bloch’s 
first book marked the start of a new epoch, or at least that people wanted to read it in that way. 
Conditioned by the war, by academic philosophy which had become increasingly dry and barren 
under Neokantianism (it would not be until 1927 that Heidegger would revolutionize the 
academic philosophical landscape), and by the waning significance of Nietzsche (who was, of 
course, to make a huge come-back later in the century), Geist der Utopie gave voice to a 
generation and indeed to a range of constituencies within it: young Jewish intellectuals, 
expressionist painters, communist activists, pacifists, surrealists. Adorno referred to Geist der 
Utopie as the philosophy of expressionism; Oskar Negt called Bloch the philosopher of the 
October revolution.  
 The idea of utopia would not disappear from German thought, at least for a generation. It 
was only after Adorno’s death, when Habermas rose to power in the Frankfurt School, that the 
critique of utopian thinking started. Nonetheless, the notion of domination-free communication 
(herrschaftsfreie Kommunikation), which underpins his version of critical theory, has many 
utopian overtones—although he would probably not acknowledge this himself. It is more than a 
regulative idea because it must obtain in democratic public rational debate; it cannot come at the 
end when all has been put right, but rather it is the mechanism that allows for progress. At the 
same time and by the same token, it is the yardstick of critical theory in that it functions as a 
                                                                                                                                                       
Experience,” in Notes to Literature, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 211-212. 
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principle of critique of practices and institutions in modern societies that fall short of it. 
Habermas never changed his position on this point. Still, to use the words of Adorno, the sheer 
formal nature of the idea of communicative rationality also exposed Habermas’s thought to the 
resignation about which Adorno spoke. This lands Habermas in problems as it forces him on the 
one hand into a social theory that cannot provide motivations for action because it has no 
material view of the good life; this is the point where Honneth seeks to make amends with the 
idea of pathologies of reason, as the stronger version of Habermas’s distortions of 
communication. On the other hand the underlying philosophy of language or rationality is, in the 
eyes of many critics, far too forceful in the universality to which it must ascribe its version of 
rationality. This is so because that concept is based entirely on the formal properties of 
communicative interaction, and these are, presumably, universal, simply because they follow 
from the characteristics of linguistic interaction. The theory of communicative rationality, as a 
critical theory, is in other words both too weak and too strong.  
 Later on, in the years of postmodernism, the end of grand narratives, and the end of 
history, the light of utopia shimmered even less than in the snow storms before 1918. In those 
years Klaus Berghahn did much for utopian thought by emphasizing the parallels between 
Bloch’s notion of the trace and the postmodern use of this notion. He kept hope alive. Bloch’s 
utopia was never the massive, programmatic, linear-historical, teleological vision of which his 
critics had accused him, but a much more fragile and variegated experience of the possibility that 
things could be different, and it was Berghahn who reminded us so insistently of that.15 Today, 
we find ourselves in a different world again, forcing us to recognize that the dynamics of 
                                               
15 Klaus L. Berghahn, “A View Through the Red Window: Ernst Bloch’s Spuren,” in Not-Yet: 
Reconsidering Ernst Bloch, eds. Jamie Owen Daniel and Tom Moylan (London: Verso, 1997), 
202–14; Klaus L. Berghahn, Zukunft in der Vergangenheit – Auf Ernst Blochs Spuren (Bielefeld: 
Aisthesis, 2008). 
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capitalist social structure, which earlier critical theory had theorized, have not disappeared, and 
that we are more than ever in need of new ways to understand where our agency lies, how 
transformation might be possible, and what, in the words of Kant, we may hope for. Bloch’s 
philosophy, which he himself called a docta spes, a learned hope, a hope that has lived through 
disappointment (“militanter Optimismus mit Trauerflor” [militant optimism with a mourning 
wreath]), has become relevant again, in a new way. Now, the indeterminacy or openness at the 
heart of the idea of utopia in Bloch’s thought can function as an inspiration for creative, new 
thinking. If we look back in time, Geist der Utopie appears as the starting point of the critique of 
positivism in philosophy; if we look forward, the idea of indeterminacy stands out. Bloch sees 
the world as not yet finished—die unfertige Welt. Not just our experience or understanding of it 
is incomplete; reality itself is not yet what it is or can be. This includes the sphere of human 
existence. But what does it mean to say that the world is not yet finished? 
 We have to go back to the beginning. What was Bloch contending with in Geist der 
Utopie? He writes: 
Wir haben Sehnsucht und kurzes Wissen, aber wenig Tat und was deren Fehlen 
mit erklärt, keine Weite, keine Aussicht, keine Enden, keine innere Schwelle, 
geahnt überschritten, keinen utopisch prinzipiellen Begriff. Diesen zu finden, das 
Rechte zu finden, um dessentwillen es sich ziemt, zu leben, organisiert zu sein, 
Zeit zu haben, dazu gehen wir, hauen wir die phantastisch-konstitutiven Wege, 
rufen was nicht ist, bauen ins Blaue hinein, bauen uns ins Blaue hinein und 
suchen dort das Wahre, Wirkliche, wo das bloss Tatsächliche verschwindet. 
[We have longing, and brief knowledge, but little deed, and—which also explains 
this lack—no breadth, no outlook, no ends, no inner threshold, presentiently 
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crossed, no utopian principled concept. To find it, to find the right thing, for 
which it is worthy to live, to be organized, and to have time: that is why we go, 
why we cut new, metaphysically constitutive paths, summon what is not, build 
into the blue, and build ourselves into the blue, and there seek the true, the real, 
where the merely factual disappears.]16 
The positivist criteria of verifiability and meaningfulness, the worship of facts and reference, of 
the way things are, are here completely repudiated in the name of a conception of truth and 
reality itself that is located in the sphere of fantasy (Bloch indeed speaks of “objective fantasy” 
in other texts17), a fantasy that is constitutive of the ways in which we realize and actualize 
ourselves. This quotation also gives us an indication of the way in which utopian fantasy works. 
Bloch speaks of an “innere Schwelle, geahnt überschritten.” The hunch, presentiment, or 
intimation, the Ahnung, is the way in which we overcome inner thresholds, and this is the way in 
which we seek for truth and reality beyond what is factually the case. Creative transformation is 
not a smooth rolling out of what exists already within ourselves, but a movement that 
transgresses a threshold in the light of an Ahnung. Bloch continues, right after this paragraph: 
“Incipit vita nova.” In this movement we encounter the new, and in this movement we also take 
possession of ourselves as in the process of becoming. Agency is at work here beyond the 
distinction between activity and passivity, perhaps in the way in which artistic creation, romantic 
love, or the Gelassenheit [serenity] of which Meister Eckhart speaks can be experienced beyond 
that distinction, or involving both at the same time. The Ahnung has a receptive quality of 
                                               
16 Ernst Bloch, Geist der Utopie, Faksimile der Erstausgabe 1918, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 16 
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 9; in English: Spirit of Utopia, trans. Anthony A. Nassar 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 3, translation altered. 
17 Ernst Bloch, Philosophische Aufsätze zur Objektiven Phantasie, Bloch, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 
10 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1969). 
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openness, but the transgression is a self-determination. We become what we are by going out of 
ourselves. But if language is determined by reference, and if we say, as Bloch does here, that 
truth and reality are to be found beyond the facts, in an intimation that pushes us beyond a 
threshold, presumably a threshold thrown up by the facts, into the new, then how can we speak 
meaningfully about it? It seems that only a negative, apophatic language could hint at that which 
is not yet the case and its temporal dimension, the future in the radical sense in which we are 
speaking about it here and not as a projection or anticipation informed by what is presently the 
case. 
 The idea that philosophy, conceived as a thinking of the real, runs up against 
impossibility is not new. It can be identified in almost all philosophers, from Plato and Plotinus 
to Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Whether the point is articulated in terms 
of the discrepancy between the discursiveness or mediatedness of reason and the immediacy of 
intuition, or whether it is conceived in terms of reason’s innate drive to ask questions it cannot 
answer, or in terms of language running up against its limits, or in terms of language’s tendency 
to overstep its limits and thus, negatively, to indicate what it wants to say in the moment of its 
collapse, it is easy to see the parallels, not just in modernity with its avowed penchant for 
apophansis but going back to the beginnings of philosophy. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof 
one must be silent. Where this attitude becomes a positivism of meaning that forgets what it was 
we could not speak about, it hardens into ideology and silencing (as we have seen happen with 
analytical philosophy, which has sometimes been the ideological loin cloth of the 
functionalization of reason). For Bloch, as later for Adorno, the attitude is a different one: of all 
Pre-Publication final draft. In: Back to the Future: Tradition and Innovation in German Studies. Silberman, Marc, 
ed., German Life and Civilization, 68 (68). Peter Lang, New York, pp. 37-62. ISBN 9781788743044. 
(doi:10.3726/b13304) 
 
the things philosophy has to speak about, none is more important than that which cannot be said, 
and which is said in the failure to say it or the halting before saying it.18  
 Many people who start reading Bloch have the experience that the ineffable core is 
always equidistant from every point in this vast corpus. We can open almost any page at random, 
which in its totality spans seventeen volumes plus at least five additional volumes of texts not 
included in the carefully planned Gesamtausgabe, and it is there. Underneath the rational 
analysis, the literary commentary, the hermeneutical interpretations, and the speculative creation 
of new concepts and ideas lies the sustaining intuition that the world is not yet finished—like a 
wellspring that remains hidden but never far. Bloch repeats himself, saying the same things about 
the same thing on every page; his writings are a perfect illustration of Bergson’s remark that all 
philosophers have one intuition, which they can never fully articulate, which is why they 
continue to try and say it again and again. Like the world, Bloch’s prose is unfertig, unfinished; 
his language, like Hegel’s, stretches and extends the expressive power of language up to and 
beyond its limits, perhaps not even German, but a utopian German, lit up by the illumination of 
the not-yet: “Das einfachste Wort ist schon viel zu viel, das erhabenste Wort wieder viel zu 
wenig” [the simplest word is already far too much, the most sublime word again far too little].19 
Bloch tries to get closer to the nature of the experience of the unfinished world, “der prinzipielle 
utopische Begriff,” our access to the real, by a reflection on basic wonder and the specific 
linguistic form of the question that is implied in it.  
 At the base of philosophical thinking lies an openness to wonder in the face of the world, 
in the face of existence, that has the affective charge of a question—a question we ask of the 
                                               
18 Heidegger makes a closely related point in his scattered meditations on sagen and versagen, 
but I will not explore these parallels here. See Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 
Gesamtausgabe, section 1, vol. 12 (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1985). 
19 Bloch, Geist der Utopie, Erstausgabe, 365. 
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world as much as a question the world asks of us—but one that cannot be further specified in 
terms of a possible answer. Even the familiar form that Leibniz gave to it: “why is there 
something and not rather nothing?” doesn’t exhaust the depth of the question contained in basic 
wonder. For we do not ask being for reasons only, and being asks more of us than reasons. Bloch 
calls it therefore “die unkonstruierbare Frage,” a questionability of being that cannot yet be bent 
or construed in the direction of a possible answer. Being is divided in itself against itself, it is not 
identical with itself, but a question onto itself.20 Because of its unconstructability, its content 
(latent as much as tendentious) is always the same wherever this wonder is found, so much so 
that it functions as an invariant of direction, a kind of magnetic North Pole at the core of all 
human projects, including the political project of creating a society of free and equal people, 
living in alliance with nature. In the concept of the invariant of direction, Bloch has found a way 
to combine an absolute conception of end or goal (“Zweck,” “Identität”) with a radical 
indeterminacy that cannot be specified other than in terms of what it is not, only accessible 
through the experience of ineffability.  
 The experience of philosophical wonder provides the basis for the articulation of the 
world as unfinished, still “in prehistory.”21 To be means not-yet-being; and the implication of the 
centrality of the ineffability for all understanding is that, in a new way as compared to Plato, we 
have to become philosophers if our world is ever to realize the utopian light of which Bloch 
speaks. Not philosopher-kings but philosopher-citizens, philosopher-creators, philosopher-lovers 
and friends, and philosopher-workers.22 This absolute concept of goal, the invariant of direction, 
                                               
20 Bloch, Geist der Utopie, Erstausgabe, 343–89. 
21 Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), 1643. 
22 Alain Badiou makes this point in Badiou, Plato’s Republic: A Dialogue in Sixteen Chapters, 
trans. Susan Spitzer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). See Bloch, “Über den 
Begriff Weisheit,” in Bloch, Philosophische Aufsätze zur Objektiven Phantasie, 355–411. 
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is the safety pin that prevents our utopian projects both from becoming totalitarian or 
programmatic, as well as from defeating themselves in relativistic practicality. This “warm 
stream” of thought, containing the whole spectrum of human longings and the ultraviolet of the 
unconstructable question, is complemented by the “cold stream” of disillusioned ideology 
critique. Both require each other.23 
 The ontology of the not-yet is an attempt to articulate the “unfinishedness” of the world 
in terms of a radical openness towards novelty. The silent core of existence, which has not yet 
been brought out, is the site of indeterminacy, openness, what might be but might also never 
come to pass, the inarticulate core within more articulate or definite desires and aims. Something 
is missing. This aspect is central to the way Bloch understands the utopian, as we have seen, and 
it is a fundamental feature of the real as such. Reality is at a distance from itself; there is a gap 
that cannot be grasped or pinned down. At the same time the utopian moment, the non-place of 
which he writes at the very end of Das Prinzip Hoffnung, is the light that shines into the 
childhood of each of us. In Geist der Utopie the final formulation of “der prinzipielle utopische 
Begriff” is as follows: 
Die bestehende Welt ist die vergangene Welt und das geistentleerte Objekt der 
Einzelwissenschaft; aber die menschliche Sehnsucht in beiderlei Gestalt: als 
Unruhe und als Wachtraum, ist das Segel in die andere Welt. Dieses Intendieren 
auf einen Stern, eine Freude, eine Wahrheit gegen die Empirie, hinter ihren 
satanischen, und erst recht hinter ihren Inkognito-Nacht, ist der einzige Weg, noch 
Wahrheit zu finden; die Frage nach uns ist das einzige Problem, die Resultante 
aller Weltprobleme, und die Fassung dieses Selbst- und Wir-Problems in Allem, 
                                               
23 Bloch uses the concepts of warm stream and cold stream extensively. See, for example, Bloch, 
Das Prinzip Hoffnung, Part III, passim. 
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die weltdurchschwingende Eröffnung der Pforten der Heimkehr ist das 
letzthinnige Grundprinzip der utopischen Philosophie. Nur dann müßte das 
Intendieren auf die geheime, nocht nicht seiende Freude über unserem Haupt, auf 
die Enthüllung des allösenden Existenzworts verzagen, wenn auch dasjenige in 
uns, was noch nicht geleuchtet hat, bereits geleuchtet hätte; so aber beginnt 
endlich die Philosophie nicht nur gewissenhaft zu sein, aber zu ahnen, wozu, und 
gewissen zu haben; ihr eingedenken, ihr synthetisch erweiternder Messianismus a 
priori schafft endlich das reich der zweiten, der allein wahrhaftigen Wahrheit: in 
der Welt, gegen die Welt und ihre bloße Tatsachenwahrheit die Spuren, die 
konzentrischen Promiskuitäten der Utopie zu suchen, zu beschleunigen, zu 
vollenden. 
[The existing world is the world of the past, and the despiritualized object of 
science, but human longing in both forms—as impatience and as waking dream—
is the mainsail into the other world. This intending toward a star, a joy, a truth to 
set against the empirical, beyond its satanic night and especially beyond its night 
of incognito, is the only way to still find truth; the question about us is the only 
problem, the resultant of every word-problem, and to formulate this Self- and We-
Problem in everything, the opening, reverberating through the world, of the gates 
of homecoming, is the ultimate basic principle of utopian philosophy. Only then 
should the intention toward the secret, still not existent joy above our Head, the 
disclosure of the all-redeeming existence-world fail, when that within us which 
has not shone will also have shone; in this way, however, philosophy finally 
begins not only to be conscientious, but to suspect what for, and to have a 
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conscience; its mindful remembrance, its synthetically expanding messianism a 
priori finally creates the Kingdom of the second, the alone truthful truth: to find, 
to accelerate, to consummate, in the world and its mere factual truth, the traces, 
concentric promiscuities of utopia.]24 
Here we see how the transgressive move of transcending without transcendence, the gateway or 
door, “geahnt überschritten,” is explicitly identified as the principle of Bloch’s philosophy. We 
find here, as later in Das Prinzip Hoffnung, the term “principle,” but not as founding ground (of 
which Adorno quipped that hope can be anything, but not a principle). Rather it is the axiomatic 
base and remaining center of philosophy, around which the dreams of a better life circle.25 The 
phrase “concentric promiscuities” relates to the invariant of direction that the center as principle 
is, and the transgressive nature of the utopian. The traces of the utopian can be found everywhere 
and they are always a matter of a threshold and a transgression, a kind of surplus, excess, or 
ontological generosity, but they all have the same ineffable and empty core: both dimensions are 
needed for a genuinely utopian trace. With this, the idea of utopia is not just a theoretical or 
reflective notion, but it becomes a principle of action, although in a different way from 
Honneth’s exhortative remembrances. It provides a criterion, as it were, to distinguish false from 
true utopias. Philosophy as the rebellion against the worship of the facts and the resignation of 
method, Adorno’s “curse of the official,” has been given hands and feet. 
 From the point of view of the not-yet, the history of philosophy can be read as a series of 
                                               
24 Ernst Bloch, Geist der Utopie: Bearbeitete Neuauflage der zweiten Fassung von 1923, 
Gesamtausgabe vol. 3 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1964), 251–2; in English: Spirit of Utopia, 
206–7, translation altered.  
25 Perhaps it is helpful to recall that Heidegger explains the term axioma (Principium, 
Grundsatz), as referring to that which is held in the highest regard or esteem, that which is most 
worthy of thought, from the verb axio, to value. See Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund 
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), 34. 
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more or less conscious attempts at articulating the unfinished world, attempts that succeeded to 
some extent and failed in other aspects, but the liberating and enlightening goal of philosophy 
has always been allied to the unfinished world. Here, in a roundabout and more philosophical 
way, we can salvage Kant’s idea of a universal history. The liberating, progressive aspect of 
philosophy throughout its history is what Bloch would call its speculative materialism, 
understood as the immanent transgressive movement of matter.26 But philosophy also has, and 
has had, an ideological function; this is its idealism, and this has been its most visible, because 
institutionalized, form up until now. For Bloch in Geist der Utopie, idealism is the idea that the 
forms of creativity, the forms of the possible new, are already defined in advance and have to be 
understood from their origins—as pre-given in the structure of being or in the mind of God. Here 
philosophy becomes usurped by the powers that be, a legitimization of the status quo, an 
instrument of fear instead of hope, oppression instead of liberation. Where this has happened, 
philosophy has been compromised. It has happened most obviously in those situations in which 
philosophy is an official discipline in its own right, part of an institutional framework of 
government, science, or religion. This is not philosophy as the nomadic remembrance of 
something that we miss when we think we grasp it, as the image from Petrarca’s “Sonnet VII,” 
which Schopenhauer put over his essay on academic philosophy: “povera, e nuda vai, filosofia” 
[philosophy, you go poor and naked]. In a sense the idealist compromise pervades its history, 
starting with Parmenides’ insistence on the unreality of change, and Bloch does not stop short of 
drawing the conclusion, with Marx, that the liberation of the proletariat and the realization of 
philosophy (and therefore the end of it as we know it) coincide: we can understand the full 
                                               
26 Ernst Bloch, Das Materialismusproblem. Seine Geschichte und Substanz, Bloch, 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 7 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), 377. 
Pre-Publication final draft. In: Back to the Future: Tradition and Innovation in German Studies. Silberman, Marc, 
ed., German Life and Civilization, 68 (68). Peter Lang, New York, pp. 37-62. ISBN 9781788743044. 
(doi:10.3726/b13304) 
 
meaning of each only in terms of the other. Idealism in philosophy is the reification and 
fetishization of the mind and its homogenizing understanding of the world. 
 The ontology of the not-yet is, thus, a self-avowed materialism. It does not recognize a 
separate, transcendent realm of the world that provides logical structure, mind, or form to a 
substrate that is somehow in-formed by it. There is certainly an aspect of neutral monism, as 
much as an aspect of panpsychism here, but the crucial aspect of Bloch’s conception of matter is 
its dynamic process and immanent form—and not “Klotzmaterie,” lump matter. The goal of 
process is not given in advance, but has to be created first by the process itself. There is in Bloch 
a teleology without a pre-given telos, which is another way of saying “indeterminacy.” There is a 
contingency in the metaphysical structure of reality such that what, for example, a particular 
human being is what she has perchance become up until now, and this determines at least what 
she can become at this moment. There is equally a possible, even if indeterminate, horizon of 
what the human being as such, or in principle, might yet become, although this is not, as in 
Aristotle’s entelecheia, determined as a fixed possibility in advance. That aspect of Aristotle’s 
ontology is, for Bloch, a direct result or reflection of his idealism, of his inability to think form 
itself as dynamic and changing. But we can see that this inability is not grounded in any 
conceptual necessity or conceptually necessary limitation. Genuine novelty is possible, or better: 
the realm of real possibility is the realm of the new. 
 There are differences of opinion as to the question whether Bloch’s contingency is 
absolute in Bloch’s ontology. Peter Thompson has argued that there is no basis for anything but a 
pure future contingency, and that where Bloch seems to indicate a teleological dimension, he is 
simply not willing to draw the radical conclusion that follows from his own materialist axiom, 
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namely that the gap in the real itself will never be closed.27 This would put Bloch in near 
proximity to Žižek who re-interprets Hegel in this manner. He claims that substance on the one 
hand (self-sufficient, immediate reality, or nothingness: Sein = Nichts) and subject on the other 
(the self-divided negation of nothingness that is therefore the sphere of creatio ex nihilo) are 
incommensurable, but both need to be acknowledged. Hegelian reconciliation is the 
“reconciliation of incommensurability” by which the subject will never be identical with itself 
and will therefore always be “something,” while at the same time “objectively, nothing exists.”28 
Žižek ontologizes the postmodern constellation (the real is divided in itself); that which we have 
come to recognize about the subject, language, and meaning (difference) also applies to the real 
as such—but this now becomes itself a story of identity. We know what we are, we know what 
the world is—namely the failure to be itself, a failure that the real tries to keep from itself, but in 
doing so, it just repeats the alienation. We can summarize Žižek’s position as follows: Reality is 
a Fehlleistung [Freudian slip]. But this cannot be the bottom line of the idea of utopia, the 
bottom line of the idea of the world as unfinished. This way of thinking about the real misses the 
crucial point that Bloch makes about hope as a principle. Just as skepticism becomes dogmatic 
once it closes off the possibility that knowledge might, after all, be possible, so hope becomes 
guarantee—indeed an ontological assurance of the bad kind—when we insist we “know” that 
identity (as a chiffre for completion or fullness) cannot be. The point of hope, as of philosophical 
ignorance, is to keep those questions open. As we have seen, hope is both an affect and a virtue 
in classical philosophy as much as in Bloch’s philosophy. In Geist der Utopie it now also 
becomes a mode of knowing or consciousness, in yet another meaning of the term: the way we 
                                               
27 See Peter Thompson, “Introduction,” in The Privatisation of Hope: Ernst Bloch and the Future 
of Utopia, eds. Slavoj Žižek and Peter Thompson (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 1–20. 
28 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: 
Verso, 2012), 950–62.  
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relate to identity or fulfilment (the “Enthüllung des allösenden Existenzworts”). As we saw 
above, Bloch speaks of the need to learn how to hope—docta spes—a clear reference to 
Cusanus’s docta ignorantia. The lack of metaphysical evidence for a position of closure becomes 
the realization that openness, possibility, is real. 
 In fact, the new cannot exist without this open, unconstructable orientation towards 
identity, what Bloch calls the dimension of the Ultimum. We saw it before in the invariant of 
direction. If we want to think the new without reference to completion, we end up thinking mere 
variety, which is reduced to a form of sameness. What appears as new is then actually a mere 
mechanical repetition of what always already was, like the man going from spouse to spouse, 
and we have not moved beyond idealist philosophy and its understanding of all knowledge and 
form as rooted in anamnesis, memory of identity already known. Repetition and difference 
require each other, but they also require reference to the Ultimum, to identity as completion, 
because without it they would, paradoxically, collapse into each other. On this basis we can then 
see that in all areas of life experimentation is the creative mode of being attentive to the new and 
the ultimate. In this sense all utopian formations are centered around the openness of becoming. 
An ethic is implied, one in which the “self- and we-problem” come to be seen as matters of 
experimentation and innovation. A valuation of daring, reaching out, and relating to others, 
including nature, with sensitivity, respect for self and other, in freedom; forgiveness when things 
go wrong, care for what has become, and the willingness to try and learn—these all replace most 
of the traditional utilitarian ethical maxims of virtue and duty. True to Marx, the common 
utopian experiment of the world replaces the traditional categories of morality.  
 It is illuminating to draw two final parallels, one to Adorno and the Frankfurt School, one 
to Jean-Luc Nancy and his thoughts about community. In both we find the idea that the 
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foreclosure of identity is a requirement of openness, philosophical thinking, and ethical action. 
Adorno puts this, in the famous last aphorism of Minima Moralia, in terms of the responsibility 
of a thinking that is not “mere technique” to “contemplate the world as it will one day appear in 
the messianic light.”29 Only in this way can the “more” in life that we saw earlier be accessed, 
although Adorno himself finds no real way of doing this. The negative space not occupied by the 
facts is inaccessible for him, and his thought ends in the remembrance, the Eingedenken, of an 
impossibility and the unspoken glimmer of the hope. At least in this precarious attitude a 
witnessing occurs that might be communicated to others as both the minimum and the maximum 
of a community of mutual recognition which escapes the otherwise all-pervasive interhuman 
coldness that made Auschwitz possible: minima moralia. In the absence of an access to the 
movement Geist der Utopie tries to articulate (“innere Schwelle, geahnt überschritten”), there is 
indeed no other recourse than to the minimum form of morality, a balancing act between the 
minimum of solidarity necessary to sustain recognition without turning into a massive form of 
identity thinking.  
 Jean-Luc Nancy formulates a related point in his conception of the inoperative 
community: 
Thinking of community as essence assigns to community a common being, 
whereas community is a matter of something quite different, namely of existence 
inasmuch as it is in common, without letting itself be absorbed into a common 
substance. Being in common means, to the contrary, no longer having, in any 
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form, in any empirical or ideal place, such a substantial identity, and sharing this 
lack of identity.30 
The non-place of utopia is, indeed, neither an empirical nor an ideal place, but it is real. A 
Blochian approach would emphatically agree with much here, but Nancy’s view suffers from a 
problem  similar to Žižek. An essentialized notion of identity as already-become is replaced with 
its opposite, but this merely leads to a repetition of the original reified notion of identity, now as 
absence, a nothingness that cannot be thought and offers no more concrete handles for 
engagement and letting-be than Adorno’s way of non-identity thinking. The real advance that 
Bloch’s philosophy makes possible is to move beyond this stalemate in a genuine ontology of 
not-yet-being, in other words of real novelty that is grounded in the—cognitive, affective, and 
active—attitude of hope. With the word attitude I try to capture a dimension that transcends and 
retains the distinction between affect and virtue. Only when a “lack of identity” is conceived as a 
lack, but now in the radical, creative way that Bloch has explored in his philosophy—despite the 
misunderstanding that he sometimes gives rise to and sometimes himself succumbs to—can the 
self- and we-problem, the question of the human community as much as the community of 
humanity and non-human reality, once again achieve the stammering articulations that it is the 
job of philosophy to foster and further. Especially today, when the question of how to live 
together on our planet becomes more and more urgent, and when both the alternatives of 
thinking of human communities as revolving around substantive identities of congealed shared 
pasts or as moving around in an endless circulation of meaning, entirely devoid of identity, in a 
post-historical marketplace, have exhausted themselves and become violent, Bloch’s philosophy 
can help us to find new ways to shape openness, creative transformation, the new, and the 
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ultimate: tradition and innovation. The spirit of utopia of the past century was the protest against 
the absolutist pretensions of positivism. The spirit of utopia of the coming century is the 
awareness of indeterminacy as a prerequisite for relationality and identity as much as for 
innovation and what of tradition is worth keeping—its indeterminate, that is, its utopian, 
invariant core. We need Bloch’s philosophy, or at least some of the insights contained in it, in 
shaping our attitude to this elusive but all-important aspect of life. To find radical hope in 
hopeless times, we need more than what critical theory has to offer. Mutatis mutandis, Kant 
would agree. 
 Hope is not adequately theorized by the concepts of virtue and affect alone. Bloch 
stresses the active aspect of hope as something that, like an Aristotelian virtue, can be learned 
(docta spes). He also uses the term affect often, for example already on the first page of Das 
Prinzip Hoffnung: “Der Affekt des Hoffens geht aus sich heraus, macht die Menschen weit, statt 
sie zu verengen, kann gar nicht genug von dem wissen, was sie inwendig gezielt macht, was 
ihnen auswendig verbündet sein mag.” [The emotion of hope goes out of itself, makes people 
broad instead of confining them, cannot know nearly enough of what it is that makes them 
inwardly aimed, of what may be allied to them outwardly.]31 But even here the implication is that 
hope could be more than only an affect. Just as the existentialist tradition from Kierkegaard to 
Heidegger distinguished between fear, as the ontic affect directed at a particular threat, and 
anxiety or angst as a formal, ontological mood which discloses how things are with us and the 
world, so Bloch is careful to distinguish hope as an affect directed at a particular goal or 
outcome, and hope as mood or “Stimmung,” which is diffuse, a field rather than a specific affect, 
and which therefore acts as the “medium” for the motivating, action-oriented wishes, desires and 
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day dreams which would run asunder and dry out without this medium in which they can 
“develop themselves most easily.”32 Hope thus becomes the counterpart to angst and boredom as 
moods with an ontological purport and an ontic orientation. But other than these two moods, 
which, as Bloch sees it, exile us into nothingness or nihilism, he argues that hope is a natural 
bridge between the ontic specific content and the ontological disclosure of the meaning of 
being—or, in the language I have explored here, that concrete hopes (and actions) and radical 
hope need each other. Hope makes manifest and inhabits the crack in things and keeps the world 
open precisely because it refuses a final statement, a guarantee, one way or another. This shows 
us that transgression towards identity is a figure of infinity. It shows us that hope is not the same 
thing as optimism, prediction, or anticipation but an existential and ontological mood beyond 
activity and passivity, which includes both of these within itself and makes possible an 
engagement with concrete acts of transformation, revolt, creation, community-making, and—to 
use one of Bloch’s key words—homecoming. Here we finally find a way of understanding an old 
symbol of hope, which captures these dynamics in a single image: the anchor. Václav Havel 
apprehended its meaning in a way that resonates deeply with Bloch’s philosophy. “Hope is 
anchored somewhere beyond the horizons.”33 
 
  
                                               
32 Ibid., 119–20. 
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